### Dependability of robotic applications

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### Plan

 Brief overview of dependability Error prevention • Fault tolerance • Software fault tolerance • Case study with PILOT and its environment

## Dependability

• Property that allows users of a system to place justified trust in the service it delivers.

### • 2 main approaches :

- Error prevention:
  - Traditional approach.
  - Goal : Spread the faults before regular use of the system.
    - => other name : *fault intolerance*.
  - Based on *test* and *formal verification* methods.
- Fault tolerance:
  - Ability of a system to deliver a correct service even in the presence of faults.
  - Relies on *redundancy*.

## **Basic definitions**

- Service delivered by the system: behavior of the system as perceived by its user (s).
- *User* : another system (human or physical) that interacts with the system.
- *Failure* : the service delivered no longer fulfills the function (s) of the system.
- *Error* : Part of the system state that is likely to cause a failure.
- *Fault* : cause assumed or adjudged of an error.
  Recursive causality relationship:
  - $\dots \rightarrow$  Failure  $\rightarrow$  fault  $\rightarrow$  error  $\rightarrow$  failure  $\rightarrow \dots$

### **Classes of faults**

- Classification useful to avoid mistakes and to prevent their possibly disastrous consequences on the functioning of the system.
- Three main classification criteria:
  - Nature :
    - Accidental.
    - Intentional.
  - Origin:
    - Human.
    - Physical phenomenon.
    - Faults internal to the system,
    - External faults resulting from the interaction between the system and its environment.
  - Temporal persistence:
    - Permanent faults.
    - Temporary faults.

### **Classes of failures**

A system does not always fail in the same way.
Three main criteria of classification :

#### – Domain :

- Value failure : the value of the service delivered does not conform to its specification.
- Temporal failure : service delivery times are not compliant with the specification (early or late failure).

#### – Users perception:

- Coherent failures.
- Inconsistent failures, also called Byzantine failures.
- Consequences on environment:
  - Minor or benign failures.
  - Catastrophic failures.

## Formal verification

• 2 main approaches: Model-checking and demonstration.

- Model-checking: fully automated, 2 sub approaches :
  - Synchronous:
    - Characterized by the fact that it considers cyclic systems, whose overall behavior, by synchronous composition, can involve a set of events (qualified as simultaneous) on the resulting transition.
    - Widely used for designing reactive systems.
    - Has given rise to many complete programming environments including some dedicated to control-command (STATECHARTS, SYNCCHARTS, GRAFCET, ...), or mission programming (ORCCAD).
  - Asynchronous: Petri nets, etc.
- Demonstration: tools of proof (PVS, COQ, ...).



• Purpose: To minimize the chances of failure appearing when using the software.

- 2 approaches :
  - Static test or control : one seeks in a static way (without execution of code) simple and frequent faults.
  - Dynamic test:
    - Code executed.
    - Definition of *test data*, that is to say inputs that will be provided to the software during its execution.
    - *Test Set* or *Test Data Set:* A set of test data produced for testing.
    - Exhaustive test impossible => need to define a test set constituting a *representative sample* of all the possible entries.

### **Causes of software errors**

- The software development process has an impact on the types of potential errors.
- Poor knowledge of the programming language or inexperience of the programmer.
- Distortion or loss of information during the development process.
- Bad specification or misunderstanding of specifications, etc.

### **Classification of software errors**

### • 6 classes of errors:

- Calculation errors : for example, write "x: = x + 2" instead of "x: = y + 2".
- Logic errors : bad predicate expression. For example, by writing "if (a <b) then" instead of "if (a > b) then".
- *I / O errors :* bad formatting, bad access to communication medium, etc.
- Interface errors : bad communication between the software's internal components (e.g. call of the P1 procedure instead of P2, incorrect parameter passing, etc.).
- Data processing errors : bad access or mishandling of data (misuse of pointers, undefined variables, overflow of a table index, etc.).
- Data definition errors : erroneous type in the declaration of a variable (for example, a variable was declared as integer when it should have been declared as real), error in accuracy (for example, a value is in simple precision instead of double).

## **Classification of test techniques**

- According to the criterion adopted for the choice of representative test data :
  - Functional techniques or black boxes : production of test data based on the specification of the software without worrying about the internal structure of the software.
  - Structural techniques or white boxes : Test data are produced by analyzing the source code.
- Depending on the execution or not of the binary code:
  - *Dynamic test techniques* : The binary code is executed and the actual behavior of the program is examined.
  - *Static testing techniques*: The passive form of the program (source code) is examined.

## Notes on the test

- The testing process often uses a combination of functional, structural, dynamic and static techniques.
- Each correction inevitably leads to a risk of new errors appearing with a frequency often greater than during the previous development of the software.
  - => Need to re-run on the tested program, a significant part of the old TD (*non-regression technique*).

## Redundancy

 Presence in the system of elements fulfilling the same functions as all (total redundancy) or part (partial redundancy) of the system.

- *Primary element :* part of the system whose errors are tolerated by the redundant part.
- Implementation: Duplication in terms of specifications or implementation of elements ensuring degraded specifications.
- 2 types of redundancies: static, dynamic.

## Static redundancy

- The redundant element participates in performing the task before an error is detected and remains active.
- Typical example: triple modular redundancy



- Tolerance of errors of one among the 3 components.
- Implicit assumption that the probability that more than one element produces the same erroneous result is negligible.
- Generalization to N elements (odd N): N modular redundancy.
- Another name: *masking redundancy*.

## **Dynamic redundancy**

- The redundant element only takes part in carrying out the task after detection and reaction to an error.
- 2 forms: active, passive.
- Active redundancy:
  - The redundant element is permanently active.
  - It receives the same information as the primary element and processes it in parallel.
  - Only the primary element outputs the results.
- Passive redundancy:
  - The redundant element remains passive in the absence of error.
  - In case of error, uses information stored before the detection of error to take over from the primary element

# The different phases of fault tolerance

### • 4 main functions:

- Error detection.
- Damage assessment.
- Error handling.
- Fault treatment.
- Error detection is always the first function performed.
- Order of intervention of the other steps not predetermined and possibility of strong interaction between them.

### **Error detection**

- Based on hardware or software tests mechanisms dedicated to the monitoring of the state of the system.
- Finished by issuing an error signal (s).
- Ideal criteria for controls:
  - Be based solely on the specification of the service delivered.
  - Check the absolute conformity of the behavior of the system to its specification.
  - Be independent of the controlled system itself.
- Ideal criteria difficult to meet in practice:
  - Specification very often expressed in terms of information external to the computer system not taken into account by the computer verification.
  - Cost and performance constraints unacceptable in most cases, for runtime checks.
  - The independence between the system and its control can not be absolute.
  - => Limitation to a standard lower than the ideal.

### Damage assessment

- Purpose: Identification of failed components.
- Justifications:
  - Error detection signal very often insufficient to identify all the failed components.
  - Possible propagation of invalid information between the occurrence of the fault and its erroneous consequences.
- Two approaches:
  - Static approach:
    - Estimate a priori of the consequences of any error.
    - In case of error, all the components involved in the estimation of its consequences are supposed to be reached.
    - Difficult to adopt in complex systems.
  - Dynamic approach:
    - Exploring the state of the system after error detection to estimate the extent of damage.
    - Need to memorize the information on the different transfers and to control these transfers.

### **Error handling**

- Aim: to eliminate errors, if possible before a failure occurs.
- 2 forms: error compensation and error recovery.
- Error Compensation: The faulty state has enough redundancy to allow the delivery of a non-faulty service from the erroneous internal state.

#### • Error recovery:

- Substitution of an error-free state to the wrong state.
- 2 forms of substitutions: recovery and continuation.
- Backward error recovery :
  - Data storage (recovery data) in the course of evolution.
  - Recovery points: Data storage points.
  - System returned to a healthy state that occurred before the occurrence of error (restoring recovery points).
- Forward error recovery :
  - Apply fixes to the current state to transform it into a healthy state from which the system can operate.

## Comparison of error processing mechanisms

- Temporal and financial over-costs :
  - Error recovery: higher cost during the occurrence of error than in its absence.
  - Error compensation: shorter and constant duration, but more expensive financially.
- Backward / Forward error recovery:
  - Backward ER: no assumption on the nature of the fault (except no compromising of the recovery mechanism)
    - $\Rightarrow$  Evaluation of the damage not necessary.
    - ⇒ Recovery possible after any type of error, even unforeseen errors in the design of the system.

Forward ER: greater interest when restoration to an earlier state is not possible (e.g. printing).

### Fault treatment

- Error handling is not always enough to eliminate the error or guarantee that it will not happen again.
- Goal: To prevent one or more faults from being activated again.
- First step: diagnosis of fault (locate the causes of errors and their nature).
- Repair strategies:
  - Replacement: relies on the presence of redundant components in reserve, initially inactive, to directly replace the defective components.
  - Reconfiguration:
    - Distribution of faulty component responsibilities between the healthy system components that are running.
    - Can be static or dynamic.
- Consequence of fault treatment: Reduction of the potential of available redundancy
  - => Need for manual intervention to maintain the potential.

## Influence of the distribution

- Distributed system: set of processing nodes or processors (with embedded memory) interconnected by a communication network and communicating only by messages.
- The distribution of the processes and data on different processors makes it possible to structure and manage the redundancy.
- Specific aspects for fault tolerance:
  - Error and faults mainly handled by message.
  - Need to maintain the coherence of the overall state of the system, although not directly observable nor manipulable, despite the concomitance of executions.
- 2 approaches: backward recovery of distributed operations on distributed data, process replication.

## Backward recovery of distributed operations

- Purpose: To move distributed data from one consistent state to another consistent state.
- Risk of cascade restoration, called "domino effect".
- Establishment of coherent recovery points to avoid the domino effect.
- Let *p1*, *p2*, ..., *pn* be a set of processes that have set recovery points at times *t1*, *t2*, ..., *tn*. The set of recovery points is consistent at a later time if:
  - Between  $t_i$  and  $t_j$ ,  $p_i$  and  $p_j$  have not interacted.
  - Between t<sub>i</sub> and t, p<sub>i</sub> has not interacted with any process that does not belong to the considered set.
- A consistent set of recovery points is called a recovery line.

## **Process replication**

• Data recovery approach is not adapted in the event of a processor failure (access to recovery data).

#### • First possible solution:

- Stable storage server.
- Problem: The server can be a bottleneck and therefore limit the benefits of the distribution.
- Another approach :
  - Creating multiple copies of processes on different processors.
  - Different replication approaches: active, passive, semi-active, with respectively the same operating principle as masking redundancy, passive dynamic redundancy and active dynamic redundancy.
  - Fault treatment required, in case of failure, to retrieve the initial level of redundancy.

## Software fault tolerance

• Main mechanisms: - Exceptions mechanisms. - Functional diversification. • Functional diversification: - Recovery Blocks. – N-versions programming. - N-self-testing programming.

## **Exceptions** mechanisms

- Forward technique: application of corrections to the erroneous state.
- Efficient for the treatment of certain failures.
- Limitations :
  - Makes programs more difficult to maintain in languages such as C because of mixing of exception processing code and normal code.
  - Any type of probable error must be anticipated and appropriate exception treatments must be provided.
  - Useless for unanticipated faults like design faults.

## **Recovery blocks**

 Do not need to foresee all possible faults and associated recoveries.

• Shape :

• • •

Ensure <validity test> By <primary alternative> Else by <second alternative>

Else by <n<sup>th</sup> alternative> Else error;

 Validity test : condition (e. g. predicate on system variables) that must be satisfied by the system after execution of the recovery block.

## Recovery blocks : case of interactive processes

- Take the domino effect into account.
- Different propositions, e. g.
  - For a set of cooperating processes, all of these processes enter into a conversation before any interaction.
  - Each process saves its state before entering a conversation.
  - One process can interact with another only if it is part of the same conversation.
  - Processes only leave the conversation after having each passed their validity test.
  - All processes restore the saved state if one of the processes in the conversation has not passed its acceptance test.
- Approach similar to transactional processes in database systems.

## **N-versions** programming

### • N-modular redundancy.

- Concurrent execution of N versions of a program (N> 2) of independent but functionally equivalent designs.
- Results compared based on a majority vote that eliminates erroneous results.
- A specific program called supervisor controls the N versions and is responsible for:
  - The call of each version,
  - Waiting for the outcome of all versions,
  - The judgment of the N results.

## **N-self-testing** programming

- Self-testing component : addition of error detection mechanisms in the component to its functional processing capabilities.
- Parallel execution of at least two self-testing software components.
- Active dynamic redundancy case:
  - Only one component outputs the result.
  - In case of failure, another component that has not failed, is selected for the output of the result.

## Case study with PILOT

## Advantages and drawbacks at the beginning Propositions for reinforcing dependability



## Advantages of PILOT for dependability:

- Language level: operational semantics available, preconditions and supervising rules, possibility to modify missions during execution.
- Control system level : availability of interpretation algorithms, of Finite State Machines for the modules.

### • Drawbacks :

- « Lack of precisions » regarding the context of use of continuous actions.
- Risk of incorrect plans execution.
- Interpretation algorithms and FSM not rigorously tested nor formally checked.

### Improvements

 Precision of the context of use of continuous actions and of their termination.

• Syntax oriented edition.

• Static and dynamic testing of the interpreter.

 Modeling, simulation, testing and verification of interpretation algorithms.

 Security of plans modifications during execution.

### **Context of use of continuous actions**

### • Illustration of the problem:



• Solution proposed and implemented:

- Notions of normal sequence and specific sequence.
- Context of use: parallelism, preemption.
- At least one normal sequence in a parallel or preemption structure.
- For preemption (parallelism), stop continuous actions when one (all) normal branch (es) end.

### Syntax-driven edition

- Principle: ensure syntactic validity after each operation.
- Definition of default blocks used during insert operations.

#### • Operation:

- Start of construction with an empty sequence.
- Effective consideration of an operation only if the resulting plan is syntactically correct.
- Compliance verification of the approach



#### • Properties checked:

- Could an insertion lead to a syntactically incorrect plan?
- Is there a syntactically correct plan that can not be constructed?
- Environment used: SWI-Prolog.

### Interpreter test

- Specificity: reactive system.
- Static test:
  - Code reading.
  - Errors detected (management of interruptions, management of the termination of continuous actions, inexperience errors, etc.).
- Dynamic test:
  - Incremental approach (empty sequence, unique primitives, combinations in length, width and depth of primitives).
  - Problems: choice of the appropriate length, width and depth, relevant combinations.
  - Solution: definition of rules for choosing a representative sample of data (stability hypotheses + feedback from the tests performed).

## Modeling, simulation, testing and verification of plan interpretation algorithms

• Goal: "more rigorous" approach than the previous one.

#### • Approach:

- Modeling of plan and interpretation algorithms.
- Definition of a representative sample of the test data.
- Simulation, test and verification of operational semantics.
- Correction of possible errors and code regeneration from validated models.
- Formalism used: colored Petri nets.
- Reasons: graphic nature, simple representation of the concepts of algorithmic and programming, potential for property verification, availability of tools.
- Environment: CPN Tools (Ex Design / CPN).

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- Modeling of algorithms:
  - Modular approach: 1 *subnet* per algorithm; *subnets* communication through merged places.
  - Variables : creation of a colored token by instance, *life cycle* and *range* of the token reflecting those of the variable, access to *input variables* by *bidirectional arcs* contrary to the *output variables*.
  - Introduction of *runtime nodes* with the run state of the node (ready to run, running, executed).
- Verification:
  - Principle:



 Difficulties in implementation: Translation of operational semantics into CPNML, taking into account the structure of the reachability graph, extraction of essential information.

## Securing changes to plans that are running

- Aim: avoid dangerous modifications.
- Taking into account the semantics in the modification of the plan during its execution.
- Examples of litigious cases:
  - Inserting a primitive after an action or primitive that is running.
  - Deleting an active primitive.
- Specification of dynamic semantic rules based on the investigation of problematic cases.
- Implementation of the controller: creation of a separate window for the modification of the plan, need for a validation protocol.